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Executive Summary 2
In the early summer months of 2014, an increasing number of Central
American children alone and with their parents began arriving at the US-
Mexico border in search of safety and protection. The children and families
by and large came from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala - three of the most dangerous countries in
the world - to seek asylum and other humanitarian relief. Rampant
violence and persecution within homes and communities, uncontrolled and
unchecked by state authorities, compelled them to flee north for their lives.
On the scale of refugee crises worldwide, the numbers were not huge. For
example, 24,481 and 38,833 unaccompanied children, respectively, were
apprehended by US Border Patrol (USBP) in FY 2012 and FY 2013, while
68,631 children were apprehended in FY 2014 alone (USBP 2016a). In
addition, apprehensions of "family units," or parents (primarily mothers)
with children, also increased, from 15,056 families in FY 2013 to 68,684
in FY 2014 (USBP 2016b).3 While these numbers may seem large and did
represent a significant increase over prior years, they are nonetheless
1 The authors thank Katrina Myers for her excellent research support.
2 This article was drafted and sent into production prior to the November 2016 US presidential elections
and the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump. As a result, the recent policy changes of the Trump
administration are beyond the scope of this article. The authors continue to stand by their recommendations,
rooted in the US government's international and domestic legal obligations towards refugees, as the proper
course for the present day.
3 US Border Patrol (USBP) defines a "family unit" as an individual apprehended with one or more family
members (USBP 2016b). Thus, each family unit consists of two or more individuals. For example, USBP will
count as one "family unit" a mother apprehended together with her two children.
0 2017 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.
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dwarfed by refugee inflows elsewhere; for example, Turkey was host to
1.15 million Syrian refugees by year end 2014 (UNHCR 2015a), and to 2.5
million by year end 2015 (UNHCR 2016) - reflecting an influx of almost
1.5 million refugees in the course of a single year.
Nevertheless, small though they are in comparison, the numbers of
Central American women and children seeking asylum at our southern
border, concentrated in the summer months of 2014, did reflect a jump
from prior years. These increases drew heightened media attention, and
both news outlets and official US government statements termed the flow
a "surge" and a "crisis" (e.g., Basu 2014; Foley 2014; Negroponte 2014).
The sense of crisis was heightened by the lack of preparedness by the
federal government, in particular, to process and provide proper custody
arrangements for unaccompanied children as required by federal law.
Images of children crowded shoulder to shoulder in US Customs and Border
Protection holding cells generated a sense of urgency across the political
spectrum (e.g., Fraser-Chanpong 2014; Tobias 2014).
Responses to this "surge," and explanations for it, varied widely in policy,
media, and government circles. Two competing narratives emerged,
rooted in two very disparate views of the "crisis." One argues that "push"
factors in the home countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
drove children and families to flee as bona fide asylum seekers; the other
asserted that "pull" factors drew these individuals to the United States. For
those adopting the "push" factor outlook, the crisis is a humanitarian one,
reflecting human rights violations and deprivations in the region, and the
protection needs of refugees (UNHCR 2015b; UNHCR 2014; Musalo et al.
2015). While acknowledging that reasons for migration may be mixed, this
view recognizes the seriousness of regional refugee protection needs. For
those focusing on "pull" factors, the crisis has its roots in border enforcement
policies that were perceived as lax by potential migrants, and that thereby
acted as an inducement to migration (Harding 2014; Navarette, Jr. 2014).
Each narrative, in turn, suggests a very different response to the influx of
women and children at US borders. If "push" factors predominately drive
migration, then protective policies in accordance with international and
domestic legal obligations toward refugees must predominately inform US
reaction. Even apart from the legal and moral rightness of this approach,
any long-term goal of lowering the number of Central American migrants
at the US-Mexico border, practically speaking, would have to address the
root causes of violence in their home countries. On the other hand, if "pull"
factors are granted greater causal weight, it would seem that stringent
enforcement policies that make coming to the US less attractive and
profitable would be a more effective deterrent. In that latter case, tactics
imposing human costs on migrants, such as detention, speedy return, or
other harsh or cursory treatment - while perhaps not morally justified -
would at least make logical sense.
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Immediately upon the summer influx of 2014, the Obama administration
unequivocally adopted the "pull" factor narrative and enacted a spate of
hostile deterrence-based policies as a result. In July 2014, President Obama
asked Congress to appropriate $3.7 billion in emergency funds to address
the influx of Central American women and children crossing the border
(Cohen 2014). The majority of funding focused on heightened enforcement at
the border -including funding for 6,300 new beds to detain families (LIRS
and WRC 2014, 5). The budget also included, in yet another demonstration
of a "pull"-factor-based deterrence approach, money for State Department
officials to counter the supposed "misinformation" spreading in Central
America regarding the possibility of obtaining legal status in the United
States. The US government also funded and encouraged the governments
of Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras to turn around Central American
asylum seekers before they ever could reach US border (Frelick, Kysel, and
Podkul 2016).
Each of these policies, among other harsh practices, continues to the
present day. But, by and large they have not had a deterrent effect.
Although the numbers of unaccompanied children and mothers with
children dropped in early 2015, the numbers began climbing again in late
2015 and remained high through 2016, exceeding in August and September
2015 the unaccompanied child and "family unit" apprehension figures for
those same months in 2014 (USBP 2016a; USBP 2016b). Moreover, that
temporary drop in early 2015 likely reflects US interdiction policies rather
than any "deterrent" effect of harsh policies at or within US own borders,
as the drop in numbers of Central American women and children arriving
at the US border in the early months of 2015 corresponded largely with
a spike in deportations by Mexico (WOLA 2015). In all events, in 2015,
UNCHR found that the number of individuals from the Northern Triangle
requesting asylum in Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama had
increased 13-fold since 2008 (UNCHR 2015b).
Thus, the Obama administration's harsh policies did not, in fact, deter
Central American women and children from attempting to flee their
countries. This, we argue, is because the "push" factor narrative is the
correct one. The crisis we face is accordingly humanitarian in nature and
regional in scope - and the migrant "surge" is undoubtedly a refugee flow.
By refusing to acknowledge and address the reality of the violence and
persecution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the US government
has failed to lessen the refugee crisis in its own region. Nor do its actions
comport with its domestic and international legal obligations towards
refugees.
This article proceeds in four parts. In the first section, we examine and
critique the administration's "pull"-factor-based policies during and after
the 2014 summer surge, in particular through the expansion of family
detention, accelerated procedures, raids, and interdiction. In section two,
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we look to the true "push" factors behind the migration surge - namely,
societal violence, violence in the home, and poverty and exclusion in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Our analysis here includes an
overview of the United States' responsibility for creating present conditions
in these countries via decades of misguided foreign policy interventions.
Our penultimate section explores the ways in which our current deterrence-
based policies echo missteps of our past, particularly through constructive
refoulement and the denial of protection to legitimate refugees. Finally, we
conclude by offering recommendations to the US government for a more
effective approach to the influx of Central American women and children
at our border, one that addresses the real reasons for their flight and that
furthers a sustainable solution consistent with US and international legal
obligations and moral principles. Our overarching recommendation is
that the US government immediately recognize the humanitarian crisis
occurring in the Northern Triangle countries and the legitimate need of
individuals from these countries for refugee protection. Flowing from that
core recommendation are additional suggested measures, including the
immediate cessation of hostile, deterrence-based policies such as raids,
family detention, and interdiction; adherence to proper interpretations
of asylum and refugee law; increased funding for long-term solutions to
violence and poverty in these countries, and curtailment of funding for
enforcement; and temporary measures to ensure that no refugees are
returned to persecution in these countries.
I. The Obama Administration's Adoption of a "Pull" Factor
Narrative
In response to the migration surge of Central American women and children in summer
2014, the Obama administration immediately took a harsh stance and adopted a raft of
punitive policies rooted in its "pull" factor narrative. Despite the fact that heightened
numbers of asylum-seeking women and children continue to cross the US-Mexico border
even in the face of these policies, the US continued its deterrence-based approach.
The most immediately visible and hotly contested policy response was the rapid and
unprecedented expansion of family detention along the southern border. Capacity for
detaining families together - primarily mothers with their children - in US immigration
custody expanded from less than a hundred beds in early 2014 to thousands by the end
of the same year. A range of other deterrence-based policies also ensued, including the
use of accelerated immigration proceedings for families and unaccompanied children in
immigration courts, the increasing use of expedited removal of families, and raids of Central
American asylum seekers carried out in January and the summer of 2016. Moreover, the
United States has encouraged and funded the constructive refoulement of asylum seekers
south of its own border, primarily through military and police funding for Mexican and
Central American authorities, who turn back asylum seekers before they can reach the
United States (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016). In addition, as discussed in section
III below, the Obama administration restrictively interpreted substantive asylum law in
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a continuing attempt to limit refugee protections, particularly with regard to the claims
commonly made by individuals from the Northern Triangle of Central America.
1. Family Detention
At the beginning of 2014, a single 94-bed facility in Berks County, Pennsylvania was the
only family immigration detention center in the United States. A larger family facility with
512 beds in Texas, the Don T. Hutto facility ("Hutto"), had operated from 2006-2009, but
it closed down following heightened media scrutiny, a human rights investigation, and
litigation (LIRS and WRC 2014, 5). Media and human rights reports examining the Texas
facility criticized, in particular, the negative developmental effects of detention on children,
many of whom suffered from depression and weight loss (ABA 2015, 14). A lawsuit filed
in 2007 highlighted inhumane conditions for families at Hutto and alleged that the facility
violated the terms of a 1997 settlement agreement in Flores v. Reno. That agreement required
that children in immigration custody be held in the least restrictive setting possible, with
a strong presumption favoring release to a parent or family member. The settlement also
required state licensing for all US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention
centers holding children. Hutto, a converted medium security prison that formerly held
adult male inmates, was not licensed to provide child care and was decidedly restrictive,
with children and families treated like prisoners. Restrictions included minimal freedom
of movement, limited access to outdoor space, and an initial offering of only one hour of
education a day for children (ABA 2015, 14). In response to the lawsuit, ICE agreed to
make a number of changes to the facility in late 2007. Following an internal assessment in
early 2009 that highlighted the special needs of families (Schriro 2009), the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) ultimately closed the facility in September 2009, converting
it into a detention center for adult women only.
Thus, from 2009 to 2014, the only family detention center in operation was a small facility
in Berks County, which held both mothers and fathers with children. In response to the
summer 2014 "surge" of families arriving at the US-Mexico border to seek asylum, however,
DHS hastily opened a new facility in the remote town of Artesia, New Mexico - a 3.5-
hour drive away from the nearest legal service providers (ABA 2015, 20). The 700-bed
facility was originally a law enforcement training barracks that DHS quickly repurposed to
house mothers with their children (ABA 2015, 19). The facility opened in June 2014 and
ran as a "deportation mill" (Burnett 2014); within its first few weeks of operation, over 200
mothers and children were removed to the Northern Triangle (Hylton 2015). The makeshift
facility in Artesia garnered criticism on a range of issues, including inadequate healthcare,
social services, and access to counsel. In summer 2014, the ACLU and other groups sued,
alleging that the facility violated the due process and other rights of detained mothers and
children.4 ICE closed the Artesia facility in December 2014, stating that it had been meant
for temporary use. Following this closure, the MS.P C. lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed.
The expansion of family detention did not end with the Artesia facility's closing. Rather,
by August 2014, the private prison company GEO Group - the second-largest in America
4 ASRC v Johnson, No. 14-01437 (Aug. 22, 2014).
5 M&RC v Johnson, No. 14-01437 (Jan.30., 2015).
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- had already begun to operate a large, 532-bed family detention center in Karnes City,
Texas (ABA2015, 22). In December 2014, ICE and GEO Group urged regulators to permit
an expansion of the site of the prison, which increased the capacity of the Karnes facility to
1,158 beds. Meanwhile, in Dilley, Texas, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)
- the largest private prison company in America - began operations at the "South Texas
Family Residential Center" in December 2014. The 2,400-bed facility in Dilley consists
largely of connected trailer structures and has been compared to World War II Japanese
internment camps (Takei 2015). Both facilities hold mothers with children; only Berks
detains fathers and mothers with children.
Overall, from 2014 to the present day, in direct response to the influx of Central American
families and children seeking asylum, the government rapidly expanded the capacity for
family detention from less than 100 beds to over 3,500. The administration was explicit
in its deterrence-based rationale for this unprecedented expansion of prison bed space. In
testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations in June 2014, DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson asserted, "[T]here are adults who brought their children with them. Again,
our message to this group is simple: We will send you back . . . Last week we opened a
detention facility in Artesia, New Mexico for this purpose" (Johnson 2014). So strong were
its deterrence-based motives, in fact, the administration adopted a strict "no-release" policy
toward families in detention. Pursuant to this policy, DHS generally refused to exercise its
own discretion to release families locked away in Dilley, Karnes, and Berks even after they
established a likelihood of asylum eligibility. DHS additionally opposed release for these
same families in bond hearings before immigration judges. A federal lawsuit, brought by the
ACLU, University of Texas Law School's Immigration Clinic, and the law firm Covington
& Burling resulted in a preliminary injunction against the no-release policy. The court in
that case, R.I.L.R. v. Johnson, reaffirmed the civil nature of immigration detention and the
principle that blanket deterrence rationales - inherently punitive in nature - would likely
violate long-standing constitutional principles on the permissible uses of civil detention.6
Following the issuance of the preliminary injunction, DHS backed down from its no-release
policy and agreed to stop using blanket deterrence rationales in its own custody decisions
as well as in bond hearings for asylum seeker families. However, DHS continues to detain
large numbers of mothers with children in family detention centers. This failure to learn
from the lessons of the past - and in particular, the negative impacts of its earlier operation
of the Hutto facility - has drawn heavy criticism and ongoing litigation (ABA 2015). All
three remaining family detention centers are the subject of lawsuits alleging violations of
the 1997 Flores settlement, which governs treatment of children in immigration detention.'
Its core provisions impose a strong presumption favoring release, and require that children
who cannot be released be held in the least restrictive setting possible. The Flores settlement
additionally sets forth a preferential list of appropriate release options for children, with
release to a parent or legal guardian the first among them, followed by release to an adult
relative or licensed program.
As in the Hutto case, counsel for the plaintiffs asserted that holding children in the family
detention centers violated the Flores agreement due to the failure to apply the presumption
6 R.I.L.R. v. Johnson, 80 F.Supp.3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015).
7 Flores v. Johnson, No. 85-4544 (July 24, 2015).
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of release for children, the restrictive nature of the facilities, and the lack of state licensing
as a child care facility for Dilley and Karnes. Notably, similar to the children housed in
the Hutto facility, the children detained in the South Texas facilities have exhibited wide-
ranging negative impacts including anxiety, weight loss, chronic illness, breakdown of
family structure, and other harms from even short periods of detention (CARA 2015b;
CARA 2015c).
On July 24, 2015, district court judge Dolly Gee ruled that the family detention facilities
violated the terms of the Flores settlement by failing to promptly release children and
holding them in restrictive and unlicensed facilities. Her ruling ordered the government
to take a number of steps to comply with the Flores agreement, including prompt release
of children along with their detained parent, in light of the agreement's first preference for
release of a parent. The order also barred the government from holding children in secure
facilities where their movements are restricted, as well as in unlicensed facilities. The
government appealed Judge Gee's decision to the Ninth Circuit, where the case remains
pending.
In the meantime, DHS took belated steps to seek child care licenses for its facilities, but
unsurprisingly ran into difficulties in getting prison-like immigration detention centers
licensed for the appropriate care of children. As with the Hutto facility, DHS failed to seek
an appropriate license for provision of child care for either the Karnes or Dilley facility
when they opened in 2014, and ran both facilities without a license for a year and a half
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) eventually granted a
license to Karnes via an ad hoc, emergency process in May 2016 (Preston 2016a). DHS
pursued a license for Dilley as well, but in May 2016, a Texas state court issued a temporary
injunction preventing DFPS from issuing a license to the facility.' The suit for an injunction,
brought by Grassroots Leadership and others, alleged that the Texas DFPS lacked statutory
authority under Texas law to grant licenses to the for-profit detention facilities under an
emergency process. In Pennsylvania, the Berks family detention center - the lone facility
among the three that operated with an appropriate license in 2014 and 2015 - lost its
license in early 2016 after a concerted advocacy effort for non-renewal. DHS appealed the
non-renewal to the state of Pennsylvania and continues to operate the facility, without a
license, while that appeal remains pending (Constable 2016).
Beginning in the summer of 2014, the Obama administration insisted on not only
entrenchment, but also expansion of family detention despite sustained criticism and
multiple legal challenges. This scaling-up - accomplished through contracts with
private prison companies - reflects a concerted effort to normalize family detention as a
permissible for-profit enterprise. But, as described above, the continuing operation of these
centers faces numerous legal obstacles, as well as organized and vocal opposition by faith
leaders, medical professionals, human rights groups, and scholars (e.g., ABA 2015; LIRS
and WRC 2014; Takei 2015). The Obama administration failed to persuade even members
of its own political party as to the legality and wisdom of this practice; over 200 members
of Congress have urged the president to end family detention (US Senate 2015; US House
2015).
8 Id.
9 Grassroots Leadership v. Texas D.IES .No. 15-004336 (May 4. 2016).
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Indeed, DHS's own Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers"o recently
released a comprehensive report calling for an immediate end to the widespread use of
family detention (ACFRC 2016). The Committee, established on July 24, 2015 by DHS,
is comprised of independent experts in education, detention reform and management,
immigration and asylum law, social service provision, and physical and mental health. Chief
among its recommendations was for DHS to limit the use of detention against families in
almost all circumstances, with rare exceptions only for cases where individualized flight
risk or danger cannot be mitigated by any conditions of release.
In one encouraging development, however, Secretary Johnson recently announced that
DHS would review its use of private immigration detention centers, including those used
for families (DHS 2016). His announcement followed the Department of Justice's decision
to phase out federal private prisons due to their lesser efficacy and diminished standards
(DOJ 2016). The Secretary's announcement provides a welcome opportunity for DHS to
rethink its use of family detention, particularly in light of the recommendations of its own
advisory committee.
2. Expedited Removal, Reinstatement of Removal, and Accelerated
Proceedings
Concurrent and intertwined with the use of family detention, expedited removal of families
has also increased dramatically since 2014. Most of the families who end up in the Dilley,
Karnes, and Berks detention facilities do so while undergoing expedited removal, a
fast-track proceeding established under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Both adults and families may be subject to expedited
removal at DHS's discretion if apprehended at a port of entry or within 100 miles of a US
border within 14 days of entry."
Prior to 2014, however, asylum seeker families were generally not subject to this curtailed
process. Rather, families were typically placed into removal proceedings before an
immigration judge, in front of whom they could seek asylum (ABA 2015, 27). In these
"normal" removal proceedings, individuals have the opportunity to obtain the assistance of
counsel, present evidence in support of their claims, and cross-examine witnesses against
them, as well as to appeal negative decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
and seek review in the federal courts of appeals.12
In contrast, expedited removal is a bare-bones, administrative process that permits few
procedural protections, even to individuals raising asylum claims.13 Under this extremely
curtailed process, DHS removes people as quickly as possible, without providing them the
benefit of a hearing on the merits of their claims before an immigration judge. Those who
10 Author Musalo is a member of said committee.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); 8 CFR § 1003.19 (h)(2)(i). Unaccompanied children arriving alone, however,
are not placed into expedited removal. Instead, special screening procedures apply for children from Mexico
and Canada; children from all other countries are transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) within 72 hours of apprehension (8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232(a)).
12 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b), 1252(a)(1).
13 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
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do not express a fear of return or an intention to apply for asylum immediately upon arrival
are summarily returned to their home countries upon the simple issuance of an order by a
DHS enforcement officer.
Individuals who do express a fear of persecution or intention to apply for asylum should be
referred to an asylum officer for a curtailed screening known as a "credible fear interview"
(CFI). The CFI assesses whether individuals have a "significant possibility" of establishing
asylum eligibility; if they pass the CFI screening, they can then apply for asylum in the
immigration courts.14 In practice, however, both the initial referral process and CFI itself
are riddled with errors and offer minimal protections, particularly for detained individuals.
Human rights groups and scholars have documented numerous cases in which individuals
who should have been referred for a CFI were in fact simply removed, often after failing to
be apprised of their rights and sometimes even after expressing a fear of persecution (HRF
2015; HRW 2014; Pistone and Hoeffner 2006; USCIRF 2005). For example, Human Rights
First documented a case in which DHS deported an indigenous-language-speaking family
who had fled gang persecution without ever receiving a CFI. The father had told DHS
officials about his fear of return to the country, but the officers did not speak his language
and did not bother to secure an interpreter. Instead, DHS simply deported the entire family
without inquiring into whether or not they were afraid to return (HRF 2015, 11-12).
Even when individuals do obtain a CFI, the interview fails to provide the due process
protections of a full hearing, and suffers from erroneous determinations as a result. Access
to counsel during a CFI is restricted; regulations provide that attorneys "may be present
at the interview and may be permitted, in the discretion of the asylum officer, to present a
statement at the end of the interview" (emphasis added). 15 As a result of this broad discretion,
asylum officers often limit attorney participation to a minimum, refusing in some instances
to even let the attorney correct interpretation errors or present argument at all. During the
CFI, individuals do not have a right to review adverse evidence, present full evidence
in support of their claims, or be told, except in cursory fashion, the basis of an officer's
decision. Many of those in family detention, particularly in the Karnes facility, undergo
credible fear interviews over the phone, and thus never have an opportunity to establish
rapport, build trust, and convey credibility to an asylum officer face-to-face (IACHR 2015,
69). Moreover, asylum officers have conducted CFIs of mothers in detention in the presence
of their children, impeding the ability of mothers to testify fully and to reveal traumatizing
details such as death threats and sexual assault because they do not want to talk about such
events in front of their children (LIRS and WRC 2014). Inadequate interpretation remains
an issue for CFI interviews as well (ABA 2015, 44). In the immediate aftermath of the
surge, CFI passage rates dropped nation-wide from around 80 percent in early 2014 to only
62 percent for June-September 2014 (USCIS 2014). In the Artesia, New Mexico family
detention facility, CFI passage rates at one point dipped as low as 38 percent. 16 Although
14 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (v).
15 8 C.FR. § 208.30(d)(4).
16 MS.PC. v. Johnson, No. 14-01437 (Aug. 22, 2014). The M.S.PC. litigation, discussed in section I,
specifically challenged many of the deficiencies in the CFI process at Artesia, arguing inter alia, that
expedited removal procedures in the facility violated due process. As mentioned, DHS closed the much-
criticized Artesia facility in December 2015, and the ongoing litigation was voluntarily dismissed (M.SPC.
v. Johnson, No. 14-01437 (Aug. 22, 2014)). However, ACLU continues to litigate challenges to expedited
removal proceedings at the Berks facility, representing habeas petitioners who received a negative CFI
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the CFI passage rates at present are higher both nationally and in the Dilley, Karnes, and
Berks facilities - at or above 80 percent nationwide and in each of the three facilities -
the nature of CFIs remains curtailed (USCIS 2016a; USCIS 2016b). This raises concerns
that the smaller fraction of individuals who do not pass their CFIs may nonetheless present
legitimate asylum claims.
Moreover, review for all negative CFI determinations is extremely limited. Individuals can
seek review of the asylum officer's CFI decision before an immigration judge, but this,
too, differs vastly from the full evidentiary hearing a judge would normally conduct in
immigration proceedings. Negative CFI reviews often take place via video conference or
even telephone, and if the judge affirms the decision of the asylum officer, the individual
has no right to appeal to BIA or to petition for review by the federal circuit courts. Nor
can the individual cross-examine adverse witness or present full evidence. As in the CFI,
the government limits the ability of attorneys to participate; a 1997 immigration court
memorandum states that "there is no right to representation prior to or during the review,"
and immigration judges have curtailed attorneys' roles as a result (EOIR 1997, 10).
For families in which a parent has a prior removal order, the process poses even greater
hurdles and fewer protections. Through a mechanism termed "reinstatement of removal,"
also created by IIRIRA,1" DHS can simply reinstate the prior removal order with virtually
no process at all." If an individual with a reinstated order expresses a fear of persecution
or torture, the government refers them for a "reasonable fear interview" (RFI), a screening
interview in which applicants have to meet a higher standard than in a CFI. Individuals
who establish reasonable fear are placed into "withholding-only" proceedings in which
they may seek only withholding of removal or Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief
- and not asylum. Although withholding of removal and CAT prohibit return to torture or
persecution, they provide far fewer protections and benefits than asylum. Unlike asylees,
these individuals cannot bring their spouse and children abroad to live in the United States,
do not qualify for most federal benefits, have no path to citizenship, and can have protective
status stripped away more easily. In addition, the RFI process itself is riddled with the same
due process errors that plague CFIs, such as inadequate interpretation and few procedural
protections (LIRS and WRC 2014; ABA 2015).
In addition to formal expedited removal and reinstatement of removal under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Obama administration also accelerated the proceedings of children
and families seeking asylum in other ways, in particular by "fast-tracking" their cases in the
immigration courts and before the asylum office. In July 2014, the administration announced
that immigration court dockets would prioritize the cases of "recent border crossers" (DOJ
2014). These priority dockets - referred to colloquially as "rocket dockets" - hear cases
of unaccompanied children as well as families who recently crossed the border, including
many released from family detention. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
reassigned immigration judges in courts throughout the country to these new expedited
dockets, shifting them from their regular dockets.
decision. The habeas petitions filed on behalf of mothers and children at Berks allege that expedited removal
processes in family detention violate due process and statutory rights (ACLU 2016).
17 IIRIRA 241(a)(5).
18 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5).
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The creation of these new priority dockets for children and families had a negative impact
on these vulnerable populations, particularly on their ability to find and secure counsel to
represent them in court. At first, immigration judges pursuant to the announced "fast-track"
policy routinely granted only short continuances for respondents, departing from the prior
practice of allowing longer continuances forpro se individuals to secure counsel (Srikantiah
et al. 2014). Indeed, even the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) criticized
the Administration's decision to mandate that children's cases leap ahead of other cases in
the already-backlogged court system (Solis 2014). As the NAIJ noted, "We deal with cases
that are often, in effect, death penalty cases. Immigration law enforcement must stand on
its own and not be allowed to overshadow or to control the immigration judicial process"
(ibid.). Within DHS, US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also adjusted its
scheduling to rush through child asylum cases over adult asylum cases, even for children
without counsel (Langlois 2015).
These actions pose serious due process concerns. Among the most pernicious of the effects
of expedited, curtailed, and accelerated procedures are barriers to counsel. The limited
role and availability of counsel in CFI and RFI proceedings have led to serious errors
in those decisions, as described above. In addition, numerous studies have underscored
the importance of counsel in obtaining relief for children and survivors of trauma in
formal immigration proceedings. Children with attorneys are five times more likely to
obtain asylum or other humanitarian protection (TRAC 2015a). Adults with children with
attorneys are fourteen times more likely to secure protection in these same proceedings
(TRAC 2015b). At the same time, misinformation, lack of resources, and a lack of low-cost
and free legal services impede the ability of many to find attorneys.
Notably, the Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers recommended in its 2016
report that DHS cease placing asylum seeker families into expedited removal in light of
many of the aforementioned concerns (ACFRC 2016). Instead, the Advisory Committee
recommended that DHS return to its prior practice of simply issuing a Notice to Appear for
regular immigration court proceedings and that it promptly release families.
3. Raids
In late December 2015, media reports began to circulate surrounding upcoming raids of
Central American families and children planned by DHS (Markon and Nakamura 2015).
DHS conducted home raids over the New Year's weekend around the country and confirmed,
on January 4, 2016, that it had apprehended 121 individuals, including 71 children and 50
adults, mostly mothers (Johnson 2016b; NILC 2016). In its official statement on the raids,
DHS was explicit in its desire to use aggressive enforcement tactics as a way to send a
message to others. Secretary Johnson's opening words stated, "As I have said repeatedly,
our borders are not open to illegal migration; if you come here illegally, we will send
you back consistent with our laws and values" (Johnson 2016b). This statement fails to
recognize the right of asylum seekers to seek protection from persecution under US and
international law. Commenting on the raids later that spring, a senior DHS official reiterated,
"We cannot send a message that once families with kids cross the border, they are here to
stay. If many end up staying here indefinitely, the concern is that it will encourage further
illegal immigration" (Constable 2016).
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The invasive raids took place in the early morning hours, before dawn, with ICE agents
storming the homes of mothers with children and waking up terrified families in the dark
(Graybill and Cho 2016). According to a report on the raids in the Atlanta, Georgia region,
DHS by and large failed to secure warrants to enter homes, in violation of longstanding
constitutional principles, and also impeded the families' access to counsel after picking
them up (ibid.). ICE also used false information in some cases to gain access to homes
(ibid.; NILC 2016).
DHS transferred families subject to the raids to the Dilley family detention facility for
deportation processing. Although the government portrayed the families subject to raids as
ineligible for asylum, interviews by attorneys revealed that many of the families did in fact
have valid claims, but were often simply unable to present those claims due to an inability
to secure counsel or to understand the immigration court proceedings (Foley 2016). Indeed,
fewer than half of the individuals subject to the January raids, including young children,
had secured attorneys in their asylum cases (Preston 2016b). Pro bono attorneys with the
CARA Project at Dilley attempted to meet with all families picked up during raids, but
facility officials blocked access to most families. In the end, volunteer attorneys managed
to represent 12 families and successfully secured stays of removal by the BIA for all 12,
or over 33 individuals (AIC 2016). The fact that the BIA granted these stays speaks to
the meritorious nature of the immigrants' underlying claims for protection - as courts
considering a stay of removal must generally consider the likelihood of success on the
merits of the underlying claim.19
The aggressive home raids traumatized mothers with their young children, caused
widespread panic in immigrant communities, and drew a swift backlash of heavy criticism
(Preston 2016b). More than 100 members of the House and Senate wrote President
Obama to demand a cessation of raids (ibid.). The letter, however, had little effect. Three
months later, on March 9, 2016, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson revealed that ICE had been
conducting home raids pursuant to "Operation Guardian Border" since January 2016.
Johnson announced that this operation had led to raids resulting in the apprehension of
336 individuals, the majority of whom entered as unaccompanied children after January 1,
2014 but had since turned 18 years old (Johnson 2016a). Although ICE claimed it would
not target churches, medical offices, or schools, 10th grader Kimberly Pineda Chavez
was picked up on her way to school in Atlanta, Georgia, as were teenagers Yefri Sorto-
Hernandez and Wildin David Guillen Acosta in North Carolina (Holpuch 2016; Lee 2016).
On May 12, 2016, Reuters reported yet another spate of raids planned for summer 2016
against hundreds of families and unaccompanied children (Edwards 2016). Within just two
weeks, pro bono attorneys at the Dilley and Karnes facilities encountered 16 such families
(CARA 2016). One mother and her 14-year-old daughter were deported during the night,
even after their pro bono attorneys informed DHS officials of their intent to seek a stay of
removal (ibid.).
The raids have sown terror in immigrant communities across the country. Teachers in the
schools attended by Yefri and Wildin reported that numerous stellar immigrant students
had begun missing school or even dropped out entirely over fear of being deported (Lee
19 ken v. Holder, 556 US 418 (2009).
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2016). In one Maryland high school with a high percentage of Latino and Central American
students, attendance dropped by half following the January raids (United We Dream 2016a).
In response, the Durham school system passed a resolution calling on the administration to
end the raids (Durham School Board 2016), as did the National Education Association and
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT et al. 2016). In addition to children dropping
out of school, health care providers reported a stark decline in immigrant patient care in
affected communities (NILC 2016; Hiemstra 2016).
4. Interdiction, or Constructive Refoulement
The US government's harsh, deterrent tactics against Central Americans also extended
beyond its borders to Mexico and Central America, where it encouraged and funded strong
enforcement measures to keep asylum seekers from reaching the US border. Following
the 2014 surge, the United States worked with Mexico to increase efforts to interdict
migrants along Mexico's southern border, and funded additional programs in Honduras
and Guatemala to prevent would-be migrants from journeying north.
Since 2007, the United States has provided assistance to Mexico via the "Merida Initiative"
aid packages to fortify Mexico's southern border. This aid intensified after 2011 (Isacson et
al. 2015, 5). Following the 2014 surge, US officials and congresspersons called on Mexico
to do more to detain and deter migrants from Central America (ibid., 5). At a Senate hearing
in July 2014, Ambassador Thomas Shannon stated that a key component of US strategy
to stem the flow of unaccompanied children from Central America would be to shore up
"the ability of Mexico and Guatemala to interdict migrants before they cross into Mexico"
(Shannon 2014). According to Shannon, the United States pledged to spend $86 million
in existing funds within the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement unit (ibid.). The Department of Defense provided significant funding as well,
reporting $44.6 million dollars given to Mexican military and police officials for counter-
drug efforts (DOD 2014).
With this infusion of cash, the Mexican government intensified its own border control
efforts. On July 7, 2014, Mexican President Enrique Pefia Nieto and Guatemalan President
Otto Perez Molina announced ajoint "Southern Border Program" (ProgramaFrontera Sur
(PF S)). Pursuant to this operation, the National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de
Migraci6n (INM)), Mexico's immigration enforcement agency, increased the number of
agents on the Mexico-Guatemala border by 300 (Isacson et al. 2015, 6). Mexican federal
police at the border increased as well (ibid., 10).
In the year following the 2014 "surge," Mexico's deportations of Central American migrants
almost doubled, from 49,893 to 92,889 (WOLA 2015). The number of unaccompanied
children apprehended by Mexico jumped from 9,594 in FY 2014 to 16,038 in FY 2015
(Isacson et al. 2015, 8). These increases in apprehensions at the Southern Mexico border
correspond exactly with the decrease in apprehension of children and families at the
Southern US border. The correlation strongly suggests that heightened enforcement in
Mexico, and not diminishment of root causes of migration or US policies at or beyond the
US border to deter arrival, led to the decrease in the number of children apprehended by
US officials.
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Mexico's asylum system, however, remained woefully inadequate to address the legitimate
protection needs of Central Americans fleeing persecution. In 2014, Mexico detained over
107,000 migrants from Central America but recognized only 451 individuals as refugees
(WOLA 2015). Moreover, Mexico's aggressive enforcement efforts, at the urging of the
United States, have resulted in serious harm and human rights violations against migrants.
Groups documented numerous instances of Central Americans suffering physical and
sexual abuse by Mexican authorities, as well as due process failures and refoulement of
refugees (Isacson et al. 2015, 25-27). In Mexico's detention centers, deplorable conditions
include inadequate provision of food and medical care, as well as physical and sexual
violence by prison officials against detainees (ibid., 27). Finally, intensified enforcement
efforts have pushed migration routes through Mexico underground, making them deadlier
as a result. In particular, as both private and public security officials began cracking down
on migrants riding on the top of trains, desperate migrants have resorted to harsher, more
remote, and dangerous routes. Along these routes, criminal groups have subjected them
to robbery, sexual assault, disappearances, kidnapping, torture, and murder - at times
working in tandem or with the acquiescence of Mexican authorities (Isacson et al. 2015,
28-29; Podkul and Kysel 2015, 11-12).
Law enforcement efforts in Central American countries also intensified due to US
intervention and funding. In June 2014, Honduran law enforcement units, funded by the
US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, began a
new operation to prevent children and families from crossing the Honduras and Guatemala
border (Podkul and Kysel 2015, 9). These units received equipment and training from US
law enforcement, including ICE and US Border Patrol (Carcamo 2014). In Guatemala, the
United States provided $17 million in funding to Guatemalan army, police, and prosecutorial
officials for the creation of two border initiatives, for both the Guatemala-Mexico border
and the Guatemala-Honduras border.
In addition, while the United States government has implemented some in-country refugee
processing options for refugees from Central America, these efforts remain woefully
inadequate and do not excuse interdiction south of the US-Mexico border. The Central
American Minors (CAM) program, for example, provides refugee processing for child
refugees in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, but is limited in scope. As initially
implemented, only children with parents who have lawful status in the United States were
eligible to apply, and, as of April of 2016, the CAM program had admitted only 197 children
(Hennessy-Fisk 2016). In July 2016, the administration announced an expansion of the CAM
program to permit older siblings, biological parents, and caregivers of a qualifying child to
accompany the child to the United States (Davis 2016). It also increased in-country refugee
screening in each of the Northern Triangle countries, as well as a process - in collaboration
with the government of Costa Rica, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR),
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) - for transferring pre-screened
refugees in danger in their home countries to Costa Rica to await resettlement in the United
States (ibid.). Although these reflect significant improvements, the CAM program remains
limited to serving only the children and family members (or child caregivers) of parents
with legal status in the United States. As a result, it addresses only a fraction of the need
for refugee protection in the region. In contrast, US interdiction policies have negatively
affected tens or even hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from Central America.
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Taken together, the administration's actions amount to a multi-pronged, sustained attack
on the ability of Central American refugees to secure protection. Its deterrence-based
approach has led to aggressive measures not only at its own border but also extending
south, to Mexico and Central America. These measures place refugees in harm's way in
transit, upon arrival, and in too many cases, result in their illegal refoulement. As discussed
in section III below, restrictive interpretations of refugee law seriously limit protection to
bona fide asylum seekers as well, continuing past trends.
Deterrence tactics violate the United States'international obligations under the 1967 Refugee
Protocol, incorporating the 1951 Refugee Convention, in multiple ways. Limiting access
to its territory via interdiction - essentially externalizing the US southern border (Podkul
and Kysel 2015) - results directly in the return of refugees to situations of persecution.
However, aggressive tactics at and within its own borders lead to illegal refoulement as
well. Faulty screening processes, detention of traumatized mothers and children, and raids
capturing individuals who never had a chance to seek asylum before a judge all result
directly or indirectly in erroneous outcomes, and interfere with the fundamental right of
refugees to seek asylum under domestic and international law. At the same time, the due
process failures of these same policies pose serious constitutional concerns.
The refusal to recognize Central Americans fleeing violence as a legitimate refugee
population entirely ignores the reality of conditions in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador - and is especially pernicious given the United States' role in creating the crisis
south of its border. In section II below, we describe the root causes of migration, including
the US government's historical actions.
II. The Real Reasons for Migration: "Push" Factors in the
Northern Triangle
The migration surge from the Northern Triangle countries is explained by the dire conditions
that prevail in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Violence plagues the region; the
Northern Triangle countries have homicide rates that are among the highest in the world.
Violence against women and girls, as well as gender-motivated killings - referred to as
femicide/feminicides - also top global records.
Gangs and organized crime have proliferated, contributing to the skyrocketing levels of
violence. Household violence, which disproportionately impacts women and children, is
at epidemic proportions. Adding to this are conditions of extreme poverty and income
inequality leading to social exclusion, and depriving large segments of the population of
those minimal conditions necessary to survive.
Two recent UNHCR studies concur that country conditions in the Northern Triangle
countries, rather than pull factors in the United States, have fueled the migration surge. Its
2014 study, Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving CentralAmerica and
Mexico and the Need for International Protection, found that 58 percent of child migrants
left situations which presented "international protection concerns" fleeing violence, abuse,
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and social exclusion (UNHCR 2014, 25), while its 2015 study, Women on the Run: First-
Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico
similarly found that the women fleeing those countries "present[ed] a clear need for
international protection" (UNHCR 2015b, 2).
Assertions that the migration surge is the result of pull rather than push factors ignore the data
to the contrary, including statistics documenting that other countries in the region (Mexico,
Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama) have experienced a 13-fold increase in asylum
claims from those fleeing Northern Triangle countries (UNHCR 2015b). Although some
individuals will have mixed reasons for migration, these numbers reflect the primacy and
prevalence of protection-based needs (UNHCR 2014).
The recognition that a majority of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
have international protection concerns, and may qualify as refugees, has implications for
US policy. Punitive responses intended to deter the entry of bona fide asylum seekers -
from any region of the world - are inconsistent with obligations pursuant to international
norms as well as domestic law and are not consonant with US values and national identity.
However, in the case of the Northern Triangle countries, the United States has a moral
obligation that flows not just from international and domestic norms, but arises from
its tortured history with each one of the countries. In pursuing its own interests in the
region, the United States engaged in policies and undertook actions that indisputably have
contributed to the disastrous conditions that currently exist. An acknowledgement of this
responsibility would be welcome as an exercise in truth and reconciliation, but beyond that,
it would add to the moral heft of arguments that the United States can and should do better
in its response to those suffering the violence, inequality, and social exclusion that prevail
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
1. The History of US Involvement in the Region
The United States took actions and pursued policies in each of the Northern Triangle
countries that strengthened authoritarian, anti-democratic elements, and contributed to
the legacy of violence, poverty, and social exclusion that are root causes of the current
migration surge. The United States viewed the region through a Cold War lens and justified
its actions as fighting back the Communist threat in its "backyard." Towards that end, it
supported murderous regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador, while it worked to force the
leftist Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua. It drew Honduras into these regional conflicts
and secured its compliant support by lavishing cash assistance on its repressive military.
All of these actions have had negative consequences that continue to reverberate in the
region. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an extensively detailed description
of US interventions, but the summaries below provide a distillation of undisputed facts
regarding US involvement and their consequences.
GUATEMALA
Guatemala has "long had one of the most unequal distributions of resources and capital
in the world" (InSight Crime Guatemala n.d.). Its indigenous Mayan population has been
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"marginalized socially and politically" since the Spanish conquest, and Guatemala's
treatment of its indigenous population has been compared to South Africa's apartheid
(ibid.). Historically, efforts at reform have been met with unbridled repression.
US government involvement in Guatemala can be traced to 1954 when it orchestrated the
overthrow of the democratically-elected Guatemalan President, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman
(Gibney 1997). Arbenz had drawn the wrath of the US government for implementing a
policy of agrarian reform in which the Guatemalan government "expropriate[d] unused
land from large landholders" in exchange for government bonds (ibid., 83-84). The United
Fruit Company, a US company, which had been operating in Guatemala since 1870 and
reaping huge benefits,2 0 was not pleased with the new land reform law. The United States
subsequently cut off aid to Guatemala and then funded and trained a mercenary force to
depose Arbenz (ibid., 82-85).
The overthrow of Arbenz started a "cycle of government-sponsored violence and
repression" against Guatemalan citizens in which the United States was complicit (Rohter
1996). Guatemala was the first country in Latin America to experience death squads and
disappearances, and "US military advisers were involved in the formation of the death
squads, and the head of the US military mission publicly justified their operation" (Jonas
1996, 147).
The coup that unseated Arbenz, and the government repression that followed, were the
precursors to the decades-long Guatemalan civil war. Guerrilla forces from the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG))
fought with the objective of transforming the economic, social, and political systems which
had left the mostly indigenous population impoverished and virtually disenfranchised.
During that conflict, government security forces committed massive human rights violations,
including genocide against the indigenous population, who were perceived as supporting
the URNG (Chamarbagwala and Moran 2008). Over 200,000 to 250,000 Guatemalans -
many of them Mayan - were killed or disappeared, and more than a million people were
displaced (Musalo et al. 2010, 181). State security forces used torture, sexual violence, and
violence against women as a strategy of war (ibid., 181).
Beginning in 1966, the United States provided hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance
to Guatemala. When reported human rights violations became so egregious that the US
government could not openly continue to support the Guatemalan government, it continued
its support clandestinely from 1977 to 1983 (Gibney 1997, 80).
When the conflict ended, the URNG was left with very little bargaining power, because
the military had essentially won the war. There were no meaningful economic or social
transformations, amnesty for war crimes was enacted, and the perpetrators of gross human
rights violations during the conflict "remained in the communities and held powerful
positions in the government" (Cruz 2011, 15). The failure to purge such violent actors
during this transition is a contributing factor to the high levels of crime and corruption that
exist today.
20 United Fruit had "unlimited use of much of the country's best land, complete access to Guatemala's
resources, exemption from nearly all taxes and duties, and unlimited profit remittances" (Gibney 1997, 82).
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The US role in undermining democracy by its orchestration of the coup against Arbenz and
its support for the Guatemalan military are sobering realities. We do not purport to draw a
straight line of causation between these interventions and current conditions of violence,
inequality, and social exclusion that prevail in Guatemala. However, there is no doubt that
US actions caused untold suffering and setbacks to the struggle for justice and democracy;
one can only speculate what Guatemala would be like today if the US government had not
forced Arbenz out of office or supported the repressive Guatemalan military during the
country's civil war.
Writing in 1997, well before the current migrant surge, Gibney asked whether "the United
States Government bears some responsibility for Guatemala's decades of horror, and
whether American involvement ... should prompt special measures to help the Guatemalan
people achieve some measure of peace, security, and justice"(Gibney 1997, 79). His
questions remain valid today, with a slight rewording: To what degree does the United
States have a moral obligation to provide protection to those who flee the contemporary
violence, inequality and deprivation in Guatemala - conditions which the US government
helped create through its misguided and self-interested intervention?
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador went through a brutal 12-year civil war that ended with the signing of peace
accords in January 1992. The civil war was fought to throw off decades of economic
inequality and exploitation suffered by the majority of the population at the hands of an elite
oligarchy whose will was enforced by state security forces. During the conflict between
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the government, at least
75,000 people were killed, 7,000 were disappeared, and 500,000 were displaced (Bejarano
2002, 128; Castellano 2015, 70-71). The majority of these abuses were committed by the
Salvadoran state.
The United States - beginning with the Carter Administration, but then continuing at a
higher level under the Reagan administration - funded the military, despite incontrovertible
evidence that it committed wide-scale human rights violations and war crimes. Among the
many atrocities committed by military or paramilitary forces were the assassination of
Archbishop Oscar Romero, the kidnapping, rape, and murder of four US churchwomen,
and the killing of seven Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter at the Jose Sime6n
Cafias Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana Simeon Callas).
Violence during the war was extremely high; by late 1980, it was reported that 200
individuals were killed a week, and in early 1981 that number had jumped to 300 to 500
weekly. Notwithstanding its egregious human rights record, the US government continued
to provide military assistance to the Salvadoran government, which by the end of the war
had received more than five billion US dollars. The United States finally ended its support
in 1989 following a change in US policy and a campaign led by Senator Joseph Moakley
protesting human rights abuses in El Salvador (Howard 2007, 93-94).
The Salvadoran civil war ended in a stalemate between the FMLN and the military, with
a negotiated peace accord. For the most part, the accords failed to address the economic
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inequalities that had led to the conflict. Instead, pressure was in the opposite direction: elite
Salvadoran interests, supported by the United States, successfully pushed for the adoption
of neoliberal economic policies that led to greater poverty and marginalization among the
Salvadoran population. These policies included "eliminating price controls, deregulating
interest rates, and cutting public spending, especially in public services such as education
and health care"(Moodie 2011, 42). The social exclusion resulting from economic inequality
is a driver of migration, and, as discussed further below, is also a factor making youth more
susceptible to recruitment into gangs and organized crime syndicates.
Although the accords did not address economic equality in a meaningful manner, they
were "ambitious" in terms of reforms and democratization (Cruz 2011, 10-11). However,
they fell short in implementation on these issues. As had occurred in Guatemala, a broad
amnesty was enacted that prevented the prosecution of gross human rights violators. And
as in Guatemala, individuals associated with military or paramilitary groups were able to
incorporate into new institutions created after the accords, compromising the integrity of
these bodies. The corruption and complicity of state security forces in criminal violence
today can be partially explained by the infiltration of human rights violators and criminals
into these institutions.
US intervention in El Salvador, and its virtually unwavering support for a brutal military,
brings with it a considerable measure of moral culpability. Salvadoran society still bears
the scars inflicted by the death and destruction of the conflict, and some have commented
that the brutality and loss of life during the civil war normalized violence in the society and
contributes to contemporary levels of violence.
US complicity in human rights violations is compounded by US pressure and advocacy
for economic policies that denied the majority of Salvadorans an opportunity for self-
determination and thwarted the creation of new social and economic arrangements. Twenty
years after the end of the conflict, the evidence indicates that poverty, inequality, and
resulting social exclusion continue to be the status quo. Acknowledgement of the US role
in El Salvador, and its contribution to current conditions would be a constructive step in
reconsidering US policies towards Salvadoran migrants.
HONDURAS
When Ronald Reagan assumed the US presidency in the early 1980s, the leftist Sandinistas
in Nicaragua had forced from power dictator Anastasio Somoza, and the leftist FMLN was
battling the Salvadoran state to determine the destiny of the country. The incoming Reagan
administration, with an anti-Communist fervor, was determined to see the FMLN defeated
and to "rollback" the revolution in Nicaragua (Shepherd 1984, 112).
Honduras, with its strategic location at the northern border of Nicaragua, became the
"launchpad" for the US military intervention in the region (Shepherd 1984, 113). Based
in and operated from Honduras, the United States recruited, trained, and funded "contra"
forces to attempt to destabilize Nicaragua (ibid., 114-15). The United States also drew
Honduras into the conflict in El Salvador; US military advisors trained Salvadoran military
troops in Honduras. Through these and other measures, Honduras became central to "US
counterrevolutionary strategy in Central America" (ibid., 115).
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In exchange for undertaking this role, US military aid to Honduras "increased more than
tenfold" under the Reagan administration (Shepherd 1984, 116). So intent was the United
States on fighting "what it considered a burgeoning communist threat" that it paid a known
international drug trafficker, Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, to use his "air fleet to get aid and
weapons to the Contras" (InSight Crime Honduras n.d.). US policy, and its strengthening
of the Honduran military, had an economically harmful and politically destabilizing impact
on Honduras. "[D]emocratic institutions and practices [were] undermined" (Shepherd
1984, 135), and there was an "enormous increase in military influence" (Cruz 2011, 11).
This rise in influence was "problematic" given that, by the "mid-1980s, the military [in
Honduras] were not only responsible for human rights abuses; they were also involved in
the growing drug-trafficking rings" (ibid., 17-18).
Subsequent efforts to remove these criminal elements from security institutions had limited
success, and similar to what occurred in Guatemala and El Salvador, the criminal elements
remained in state institutions where they have had a corrupting influence and continue to
contribute to the violence and criminality Honduras is experiencing today. Honduras' police
force is considered one of the most corrupt in the region (InSight Crime Honduras n.d.).
Reports have documented the "existence of death squads within the police" (Cruz 2011,
22) as well as the murder of "hundreds of street children and suspected gang members" by
so-called "cleansing groups associated with the police" (ibid., 23).
Honduras experienced a coup in 2009. Its democratically elected president, Manual
Zelaya, was forced out of office and into exile (Meyer 2013, 3-4). Roberto Micheletti
was named by the Honduran Congress to complete Zelaya's term (ibid., 2). Although US
policy in the aftermath of the coup that forcibly removed Zelaya was initially appropriate
with condemnation and a series of sanctions, it ultimately softened (ibid., 9-10). Some
commentators have attributed this shift to the influence of the US Republican Party which
aggressively took up Micheletti's cause, with 17 Republican senators sending a letter to
then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton urging the administration to "overhaul its position
on Honduras" (Legler 2010, 609-10). 21
The human rights situation in Honduras worsened after the coup. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights found "serious violations of human rights" during
Micheletti's rule (Meyer 2013, 4). There was also an increase in violence against
"journalists and political and social activists" (ibid., 18) that continued into the term of
President Porfirio Lobo Sosa in 2013 (ibid., 2). The "exacerbated" instability in the country
had other negative consequences; "Colombian drug trafficking gangs changed their routes
to Honduras . .. just days after the coup and turned it into the principal handover point for
cocaine to Mexican cartels" (InSight Crime Honduras n.d.).
As with Guatemala and El Salvador, US interventions in Honduras have been less
frequently motivated by lofty ideals, than by shortsighted self-interest. The strengthening
of a repressive and corrupt military in Honduras, and the softening of opposition to the
2009 coup have directly contributed to the current situation in Honduras. US responsibility
21 As described by Legler. "Republican senators and congressmen undertook three separate trips to
Tegucigalpa to meet with Micheletti in defiance of the Obama government's position of diplomatic isolation.
They also held up senatorial approval of two key Obama diplomatic appointments in the Americas" (Legler
2010, 610).
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for its past actions should inform its response to those who suffer the consequences. But
instead of recognizing that, and acting accordingly, the United States has instead contributed
training and funding to Honduras Special Forces to prevent the children who are victims
of the current circumstances from migrating to safety (Musalo et al. 2015, 125). Although
these operations to stop migration have been presented as child protection measures, they
are "in reality . . . migration control" measures (ibid., 125). By militarizing the Honduran
border, they have made children more vulnerable, and have "obscure[d] the structural
causes [behind] migration of children and adolescents" (ibid., 125).
2. Recent History and Its Implications for Criminal Violence
The section above discusses the recent history of the Northern Triangle countries to expose
the role of the United States in contributing to the conditions that exist in the region and
to raise questions regarding the concomitant US moral responsibilities. An examination of
the recent history - with a focus on post-conflict transitions - also sheds light on why El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have been especially fertile ground for the explosion
of criminal violence - while a country like Nicaragua has not.
In two compelling articles, Jose Miguel Cruz has pointed to a key distinction between the
Northern Triangle countries and Nicaragua (Cruz 2011; Cruz 2015). The four countries
have a lot of similarities; all four countries experienced civil conflict and/or repressive
military regimes and currently experience high levels of poverty and inequality. Despite
these similarities, what distinguishes the Northern Triangle countries from Nicaragua is their
post-conflict/post-military regime transitions. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
the post-conflict transitions did not remove corrupt and violent state actors or effectively
prevent them from incorporating into newly formed "democratic" institutions (Cruz 2011,
14-18). In stark contrast, in Nicaragua, violent state actors were never incorporated into
post-conflict state institutions. There was an effective purging of those elements from the
dictatorial Somoza regime.
The flawed transitions of the Northern Triangle countries prevented the new security
institutions from fulfilling their intended role of strengthening the rule of law. The
incorporation of violent and/or criminal holdovers - "violent entrepreneurs" as Cruz
calls them - undermined the institutions and contributed to the high levels of corruption
and complicity with criminal enterprises which characterize the governments of all three
Northern Triangle countries. The strong presence of these unsavory elements from prior
regimes has had a secondary - but equally pernicious effect: namely that citizens in the
Northern Triangle countries lack trust in the police and related security forces. They do not
report crime, which, among other factors, contributes to the perpetuation of impunity.
Nicaragua stands in stark contrast to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.22 As a result
of the Sandinista revolution and its aftermath, the repressive elements of the prior Somoza
regime were more fully rooted out (Cruz 2011, 19-21). Although Nicaragua is the second
22 Although the authors note that Nicaragua has not faced the same level of violence country-wide, this does
not mean that individuals from Nicaragua do not raise protection needs. Rather, individuals from Nicaragua
do continue to raise meritorious refugee and asylum claims when targeted on account of protected grounds
in specific situations.
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poorest country in the hemisphere (second only to Haiti), it has not been plagued by high
levels of violent crime; its homicide rate has been relatively low compared to the Northern
Triangle countries, and gangs and organized crime have not established themselves there.
Furthermore, in Nicaragua, where efforts to remove violent and corrupt elements were more
successful, citizens have notably greater confidence in their country's law enforcement and
are more likely to report crime, both of which contribute to significantly lower rates of
criminal violence.2 3
Contrasting the situation in Nicaragua with those in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
helps illustrate how decades of US policy helped produce the current conditions that force
migrants to flee from Northern Triangle countries.
Additionally, the United States undoubtedly bears significant responsibility for the dramatic
spike in violence in the region via its deportation policies from the 1990s onward (Cruz
2011, 6-7). Notwithstanding the volatile and destabilized circumstances in each of the three
Northern Triangle countries, the United States dramatically increased its deportations of
gang members who had been raised in the United States - and became initiated into gangs
while there - to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These deportations directly "fe[d]
into the burgeoning gang infrastructure simultaneously surfacing in Northern Triangle
countries," and led to the expansion and deep entrenchment of the transnational gangs
there (de Waegh 2015).
3. The Push Factors
Numerous reports and articles detail the conditions in the Northern Triangle countries that
drive migration. The following discussion is a brief overview of factors that are at the root
cause of the migrant surge. Often, these will be intertwined, as vulnerable segments of
society disproportionately suffer from multiple forms of violence and other social ills.
SOCIETAL VIOLENCE
Societal violence, including high levels of homicides, is a primary cause of migration. In
its 2013 publication, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime reported Honduras as having the
highest homicide rate globally (90.4 killings per 100,000), El Salvador the fourth highest
(41.2 per 100,000), and Guatemala the fifth (39.9 per 100,000) (UNODC 2013, 24). The
numbers have shifted since then, with El Salvador gaining the unenviable first place slot
for highest homicide rate globally (Watts 2015). UNHCR found that 48 percent of children
(UNHCR 2014, 6) and 60 percent of women cited societal violence as a principal reason for
fleeing their home countries (UNHCR 2015b, 19). The data for Honduras and Guatemala
show that the highest rates of migration are from the departments with the most elevated
homicide rates. 2 4
23 When asked whether the police protect against crime or are involved in crime, "65.9 percent of
Guatemalans, 48.8 percent of Salvadorans and 47.2 percent of Hondurans said that the police were implicated
in criminal activities. In Nicaragua ... only 25.1 percent of people saw their police as involved in crime" (Cruz
2011, 24-25).
24 For Honduras those departments are Cort6s. Francisco Morazin, Atlantida, Yoro, Comayagua, Olancho,
Col6n, Copan, and Choluteca (Musalo et al. 2015, 89-90), while in Guatemala they are Guatemala, San
Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango. and Jutiapa (ibid., 135).
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Children and adolescents often make up a disproportionate number of homicide victims.
In El Salvador, over the past ten years, the murder rate for young people between 18 and
30 has been twice the national level, and those most affected by violence are 15 to 19 years
old (Musalo et al. 2015, 175). In Honduras, the homicide rate among males between the
ages of 20 and 34 was triple the national level, topping 300 per 100,000 (InSight Crime
Honduras n.d.).
The killings of women, including gender-motivated killings, or "femicides/feminicides"
has also been extraordinarily high in the Northern Triangle countries. From 2007 to 2012,
El Salvador was ranked number one, Honduras number two, and Guatemala number four
(GDAVD 2015, 94).
The growth of gangs has been a significant contributing factor to increased levels of violence
(GAO 2015, 4). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that there are 54,000 gang
members in the Northern Triangle countries, with 20,000 in El Salvador, 12,000 in Honduras,
and 22,000 in Guatemala (UNODC 2012, 29). Given that El Salvador's population is
substantially smaller, in relation to the other two countries, at 20,000 gang members, El
Salvador had "the highest concentration, with some 323 mareros (gang members) for every
100,000 citizens, double the level of Guatemala and Honduras" (Seelke 2014, 3).
Organized crime networks have also penetrated the region, adding to the levels of
violence. The Northern Triangle countries have the "misfortune" of being situated in the
route "connecting the world's largest drug-producing countries in South America with the
world's largest consumer of illicit drugs, the United States" (Stinchcomb and Hershberger
2014, 23). Moreover, anti-drug trafficking initiatives in Colombia and Mexico have caused
drug traffickers to change their routes. These route changes have had a disastrous impact on
the Northern Triangle countries as Mexican and Colombian drug cartels are now fighting
for control of "land and maritime routes and enlisting, to varying degrees, the support of
less sophisticated street gangs" (ibid., 23).
As discussed in section II above, flawed transitions which allowed the incorporation of
corrupt state actors into new state institutions have contributed greatly to the criminality
and levels of violence in the Northern Triangle countries. State actors have been found
to support the gangs or to be complicit in their actions. As a consequence, it is extremely
difficult for victims to find recourse against criminal elements through reporting to the
police force or government of their own countries. When unable to find safety within their
home countries, victims are migrating to countries where they believe they will be safe.
An additional factor - one also linked to US policy - was the large-scale deportation of
gang members from the United States to Northern Triangle countries, as discussed above.
VIOLENCE WITHIN THE HOME
In addition to societal violence, there are high levels of violence against women and children
within the home. Domestic violence is prevalent and widely tolerated. Although rates are
difficult to discern due to rampant underreporting and the failure of governments to collect
data, there is no doubt the numbers are high (Hermansdorfer 2012; Carcomo 2011; Bayona
2013; Najera 2012). In Honduras, for example, three-quarters of over 16,000 violence
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against women complaints filed were based on intimate partner and familial violence
(Manjoo 2015). The United Nations, moreover, has estimated that around 50 percent of
femicides/feminicides are the result of escalating intimate partner violence (UNODC
2012). While all three countries have enacted laws2 5 to prevent and punish violence against
women, implementation and enforcement of these laws has been limited, and they have yet
to bring down the prevalence of violence or the impunity enjoyed by its perpetrators.
Children are also victims of violence within the home. Corporal punishment is accepted,
and often takes the form of brutal physical abuse (Musalo et al. 2015, 66-69, 81, 135, 161).
Incest is also extremely common and generally underreported; among other ills, it has
contributed to high levels of adolescent pregnancies (Musalo et al. 2015, iii, viii, 179).
Children are also subjected to forced labor, or trafficked for sexual exploitation. Many are
abandoned by parents or extended family that do not have the means to care for them. All
three Northern Triangle countries have enacted extensive child protection laws.2 6 However,
25 In El Salvador there is a body of law "aimed at guaranteeing the right to a life free from violence
for women. Notable among these laws are: the Law Against Intra-Family Violence; the Penal Code; the
Procedural Penal Code; the Special and Comprehensive Law for a Life Free from Violence for Women; the
Law for the Integral Protection of Children and Adolescents; the Law to Establish the Salvadoran Institute for
the Development of Women; and the Law for Equality, Equity and the Eradication of Discrimination Against
Women" (Musalo et al. 2015, 176). In Honduras, the Domestic Violence Act is a preventive mechanism to
combat domestic violence. Penalties of one to three years, and up to four years in aggravated cases, are set
under article 179 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. A law against trafficking in persons was passed in April
2012. The law also sets out the structure and role of the Inter-Agency Commission to Combat Commercial
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons (art. 7). Honduras also has a national plan on violence against
women that was adopted in 2014 for the period covering 2014-2022 (Human Rights Council 2015, ¶¶60-
61). Additionally, article 118-A of the Criminal Code criminalizes femicide. In Guatemala, the Law against
Femicide and Other Forms of Violence against Women (Ley contra el Femicidio y otras Formas de Violencia
contra la Mujer) was approved in April 2008. Prior to this law, the 1996 Law to Prevent, Punish, and Eradicate
Family Violence (Ley para Prevenir Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia Intrafamiliar) addressed violence
against women (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012).
26 In El Salvador, a variety of national laws advocates for children in different ways, "among them: The
General Education Law (1996); the Law Against Intrafamilial Violence (1996); the Penal Code (2007); the
Juvenile Penal Code (1994); the Law for Access to Public Information (2010); the General Medicine Law
(2012); the Vaccine Law (2012); the General Youth Law (2012); the Special and Comprehensive Law for a
Life Free from Violence (2010); the Law for Equality, Equity and the Eradication of Discrimination Against
Women (2011); the Organic Laws of the PGR (Procuraduria General de la Republica, Procurator General
of the Republic), FGR (Fiscal General de la Republica, General Prosecutor of the Republic), and PNC
(Policia Nacional Civil, National Civil Police); the PDDH Law: the Organic Judicial Law; and the Law on
Breastfeeding (2013); and Law for the Integral Protection of Children and Adolescents (LEPINA) (2009).
In addition, regulations of the protection system were established in 2012 for CONNA, the courts for the
Protection of Children and Adolescents, and the Shared Protection Network (Red de Atenci6n Campartida
(RAC))" (Musalo et al. 2015, 184). In 2003, Guatemala passed the PINA (Protecci6n Integral de la Niihez
yAdolescencia) Law. According to article 1, "the law is a legal instrument for family integration and social
promotion that seeks the comprehensive and sustainable development of Guatemalan children and adolescents
within a democratic framework and with unrestricted respect for human rights" (ibid., 150). Honduras also
has a significant legal framework for the protection of children, which are "set out in a range of instruments,
including: The Code for the Protection of Children and Youth (C6digo de la Niliez y la Adolescencia de
Honduras, 1996); The Law for the Protection of Honduran Migrants and their Families (Ley de Protecci6n de
los Hondureihos Migrantes y sus Familiares, 2013); The Organic Law of the Honduran Institute for Children
and Families (Organica del Instituto Hondureho de la Niihez y Familia, IHNFA 1997); The Protocol for the
Repatriation of Children and Adolescent Victims of or Vulnerable to Trafficking in Persons, (Protocolo para
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as is the situation with laws addressing violence against women, there is a wide breach
between what the laws provide for, and what they have actually accomplished in terms of
protecting children from harm or punishing those who violate the rights of children (see
Musalo et al. 2015, 116, 150-52,169-70).
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND THE RESULTING SociAL ExcLUSION
The Northern Triangle countries have some of the highest levels of poverty in the Western
Hemisphere (Stinchcomb and Hershberger 2014, 16). In 2011, the World Bank reported that
"more than 60 percent of Hondurans, more than 50 percent of Guatemalans, and 30 percent
of Salvadorans live below the poverty line" (GAO 2015, 2). The poverty is combined with
extreme economic inequalities (GAO 2015, 2-3). The top 20 percent of the population of
the three countries receives more than 50 percent of the income (GAO 2015, 3).
History provides some explanation for these extreme levels of poverty and inequality; they
are - to some degree - the "legacies of centuries old oligarchic rule [and] decades of
civil war[,]" as described in section II above (Stinchcomb and Hershberger 2014, 16). In
the Northern Triangle countries hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, and
landslides add to the poverty and economic inequalities that traverse the region (see Wisner
et al. 2004).27
Recent reports focusing on child migration from the Northern Triangle countries and its root
causes have noted that social exclusion 28 deprives children of the most basic necessities,
such as access to housing, education, food, and health care (Musalo et al. 2015, 80-81;
129-130; 169-170). Certain segments of the population may be more affected by the deep
poverty; for example, in Guatemala almost 42 percent of children suffer from chronic
malnutrition, but in the northwest highlands, which has a large indigenous population, the
malnutrition rate is almost 65 percent (ibid., 13). This desperate poverty prompts many
children to migrate in search of a home where they might have their basic needs met.
III. A Repeat of the Past: US Policy towards Salvadorans
and Guatemalans in the 1980s
In the 1980s when many Salvadorans and Guatemalans were fleeing their countries' brutal
civil wars, the United States did its best to prevent them from reaching our borders. The
US government's response to those who did manage to arrive was to discourage them from
la Repatriaci6n de Nifos, Nillas yAdolescentes Victimas o Vulnerables a la Trata de Personas, 2006); The
Executive Decree for the Creation of the Department on Children and Families (Decreto Ejecutivo para la
creaci6n de la Direcci6n de Nifiez, Adolescencia y Familia, DINAF, 2014" (ibid., 95-96).
27 Following a series of natural disasters between 1998 and 2001, the United States granted temporary
protected status (TPS) to Honduran nationals (extended to January 5. 2018) and Salvadoran nationals
(extended to September 9, 2016), granting nationals of these countries the opportunity to live and work
legally in the United States (Stinchcomb and Hershberger 2014, 10-11).
28 The term "social exclusion" is used to describe the situation which arises when poverty and gross
inequalities are combined with "scarce jobs and the absence of state institutions" that could supply "minimal
resources or services" (Wisner et al. 2004, 17). Individuals are "estrange[ed] from both labor markets and
state services which is far more destructive than poverty or inequality per se" (ibid., 17).
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making claims to asylum, and when asylum applications were filed, to deny the claims at
record rates. This was later rectified after litigation. Now, instead of learning from them,
the US policies of the past appear to be the script for its current policies.
1. Constructive Refoulement
As discussed in section I, the United States has engaged in constructive refoulement by
pressuring the Mexican government to prevent Central American asylum seekers from
reaching the southern border with Mexico. As the statistics demonstrate, Mexico has
complied, showing a substantial increase in its deportation of migrants from Central
America.
This approach is a page from US policy during the Central American refugee crisis of the
1980s. As detailed in Bill Frelick's seminal article, "Running the Gauntlet: The Central
American Journey in Mexico," the United States engaged in constructive refoulement
during that earlier period too, by engaging in policies intended to "interdict Central
Americans before they ever reached the US border" (Frelick 1991, 211).
Frelick's article quotes from an internal Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
memo, which details how it would "[p]ress the State Department and ... INS liaison to
secure the assistance of Mexico and Central American countries to slow down the flow of
illegal aliens into the United States" (Frelick 1991, 211). In addition to the INS and State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency
were also involved. Interdiction of fleeing Central Americans was accomplished through
shared intelligence and increased enforcement along the migration corridor.
Statistics demonstrated the relative "success" of this strategy, with parallels to the present
day. The numbers of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans apprehended in the United
States went down, while the number of apprehensions and deportations in Mexico went
up. Between January 1989 and July 1990 Mexico summarily deported 165,000 Central
American migrants, pushing them over the border to Guatemala. At this time the United
States could not even hide behind the pretense that the migrants had been given the
opportunity to seek protection in Mexico because Mexico was not yet a signatory to the
1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, and "[t]he status of refugee, as defined in
international agreements, [did] not exist under Mexican law" (Friedland and Rodriguez y
Rodriguez 1987, 53-55).
2. Deter and Discourage
Deterrence policies of today also mirror those implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. For
example, the 1989 INS initiative dubbed "Operation Hold the Line," which consisted of
increased border enforcement and expedited proceedings had as its objective "detention
and quick deportation[.]" One of its explicit objectives was to deter Central American
migration (Frelick 1991, 210-211). Similarly, the current policy of detaining women and
children in remote detention facilities - not easily accessible to attorneys - coupled with
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policies that accelerate their court proceedings2 9 are intended to deter other migrants from
coming to the United States.
Policies implemented in that time period went beyond deterring arrival; similar to what we
see in the failures of expedited removal, discussed in section I, the legacy INS of the 1980s
also engaged in actions intended to prevent the filing of claims for asylum for those who
had reached the United States. These coercive INS policies were successfully challenged in
a class action lawsuit on behalf of Salvadoran asylum seekers. The result was the issuance
of a permanent injunction, under which the US Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) was enjoined from forcing detainees to sign voluntary departure agreements, required
to notify detainees of their rights to political asylum and to representation by counsel,
and enjoined from transferring detainees who had secured attorneys to different detention
centers.30 The injunction was renewed in 2007 and 2009, and was more recently invoked
on behalf of Salvadoran children who are part of the migrant surge.
3. Deny Protection
Salvadorans and Guatemalans seeking asylum in the 1980s were fleeing brutal civil wars in
which - as has been documented - the clear majority of the human rights violations were
committed by state actors rather than the guerrilla forces. In the case of Guatemala, the state
engaged in genocide against its indigenous population. The killings, disappearances, and
torture perpetrated by the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala were not random,
but were targeted against actual (or perceived) political opponents - arguably bringing the
individuals fleeing these practices within the ambit of the 1980 Refugee Act's protection.
Notwithstanding the horrific level of abuses, and the apparent nexus between the acts of
persecution and the victims' political opinions, the asylum grant rates for Salvadorans and
Guatemalan during that time period were abysmally low, hovering below three percent
(Gzesh 2006).
One need not look far for a number of explanations for these shamefully low grant rates.
Perhaps foremost is the fact that the United States was a major supporter of the Salvadoran
and Guatemalan governments, and it would not look good to implicitly admit - through
the granting of asylum -- that US allies' military efforts, which we were funding, resulted
in persecution of their citizenry. Secondarily, the proximity of these countries to the United
States via a land route most likely raised fears of that if protection were awarded to some,
others would follow.
The clear appearance of adjudicatory bias against Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the
1980s, demonstrated by the persistently low asylum grant rates, led to a nationwide class
action lawsuit against the then-INS. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC)
alleged a pattern and practice of discrimination in the adjudication of Salvadoran and
Guatemalan claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The plaintiffs were engaged in
extensive discovery when the INS chose to settle the case rather than to go forward with
29 These kind of expedited proceedings have been used against other disfavored nationality groups; the so-
called "Haitian program" of 1978 was "designed specifically to adjudicate. and to deny as quickly as possible
the asylum claims of Haitians" (Little 1983, 273).
30 Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F. 2d 549 (9th Cir 1990).
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litigation. A central aspect of the settlement was the INS's agreement to re-adjudicate the
asylum and withholding of removal claims of every Salvadoran and Guatemalan class
member whose case had been denied.
The settlement agreement is instructive in its core admissions. It states in relevant part:
[F]oreign policy and border enforcement considerations are not relevant to the
determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of
persecution; the fact that an individual is from a country whose government the
United States supports is not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant
for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution; whether or not the United States
Government agrees with the political or ideological beliefs of the individual is not
relevant to the determination of whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution; the same standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a
well-founded fear of persecution applies to Salvadoran and Guatemalans as applies
to all other nationalities.3 1
Although the contemporary rejection of claims from Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and
Hondurans lacks the clear foreign policy motivations that led to ABC v. Thornburgh, there
are several parallels between the experiences of Central Americans during the 1980s and
today that are worth noting.
First, during both time periods, the levels of violence and human suffering in the region
have been indisputable. Second, efforts to deter rather than protect bona fide asylum
seekers have characterized the policies undertaken. Third, and perhaps most significantly,
there have been dramatically divergent views on the proper interpretation of the refugee
definition.
During the 1980s, asylum advocates argued that interpretations of the law should be
informed more by humanitarian ideals than by restrictionist objectives. Whether it was
around issues of burden of proof,3 or the meaning of "political opinion," they argued
against rigid constructions and formalisms that would result in a denial of protection to
those at great risk. Although asylum advocates won many cases, they were unable to
prevent interpretations of the refugee definition that have had an extremely limiting impact
on the parameters of protection.3 3
These limiting interpretations have continued, and - as in earlier times - appear to be
less motivated by principled decision-making than by a desire to shut the door on certain
kinds of claims, such as gender-based claims and claims arising from Central America.
For instance, it has long been recognized that the "particular social group" ground in the
refugee definition can be applied to protect persecuted groups not covered by the other four
31 American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ca 1991).
32 1NS. v. Stevic, 467 US 407 (1983); I.NS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421(1987).
33 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the many junctures at which US law adopted definitions
which diverged from international norms and severely limited protection. One example would be the US
Supreme Court's ruling that "on account of' requires proof of persecutor's motivation (I.NS. v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)). Another example would be the US Supreme Court's ruling that the risk and
severity of persecution need not be balanced against the gravity of a crime committed, when applying the
"serious non-political crime" bar to asylum and withholding (.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US. 415 (1999).
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protected grounds. In a departure from prior precedent, as well as international guidance
- the requirements for establishing a cognizable particular social group (PSG) have been
modified, making it much more difficult to prove these claims.34
The majority of claims from the Northern Triangle countries are based on the PSG ground
of the refugee definition. Protection in these cases has been greatly restricted as a result of
the social distinction and particularity requirements.35
Until recently, a restrictive interpretive approach also characterized decision-making
around claims for asylum based on domestic violence. The jurisprudence took a wrong
turn back in 1999, with the BIA reversing an IJ's grant of asylum to a Guatemalan woman
who had fled brutal domestic violence. 36 At that time, the outgoing Clinton administration
attempted to set the law on the right track, proposing positive regulations in 2000, and
vacating the R-A- decision in 2001 (Musalo 2010). Notwithstanding these measures, it took
a legal battle of more than 15 years to obtain a precedent decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-,
establishing that women fleeing domestic violence come within the refugee definition.37
Adjudicators continue to resist the application of this precedent, which has resulted in
arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making (Bookey 2016, 19). Although the domestic
violence claims are not unique to Central America, they make up a significant percentage
of the surge cases. It is one bright spot in a somewhat bleak landscape that there is positive
jurisprudence applicable to these claims, given their prevalence among Central American
claims.
IV. Recommendations for US Policy
The Obama Administration's deterrence-based approach to Central American refugees
ignored the reality of the humanitarian crisis south of the US-Mexico border and violates
US international and domestic legal obligations. Aggressive deterrence tactics have failed
to address the root causes of migration - as reflected in heightened numbers of women
and children from the Northern Triangle who continue to arrive - while leading to
serious human rights abuses against bona fide asylum seekers. This faulty response also
34 Matter ofAcosta, the landmark 1985 ruling defining particular social group (PSG), required that the
characteristics defining the group be "immutable or fundamental." Beginning in 2006, and without
explanation, the BIA imposed the additional requirements of "social visibility" and "particularity" which
made claims based onPSG much more difficult to establish (Musalo et al. 2011, 616-617). The incorporation
of these new requirements has been frequently criticized (see Nestrud 2012), but the BIA position has been
upheld by many circuit courts of appeals (Castillo-Arias v. USAtty'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006);
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5 th Cir. 2012)).
35 Matter ofS-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008) (holding that neither youth who refused recruitment into
a gang nor their family members constitute a particular social group); Adatter ofE-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591
(BIA 2008) (holding that membership in a criminal gang canrot constitute membership in a particular social
group); Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) (holding that an "immutable characteristic" must
meet the requirement of "particularity" and "social distinction" to ensure that the proposed social group
is perceived as a distinct and discrete group by society, although this does not require literal or "ocular"
visibility); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014) (holding that former members of a particular
gang who have renounced their gang membership does not qualify as a particular social group because the
designation lacks particularity and is also too broad and subjective).
361Matter ofR-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999)
37 Matter ofA-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
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contravenes the United States' moral duty to address its historical role in the Northern
Triangle's humanitarian crisis, as well as its moral leadership in refugee and human rights
protection. We recommend that the United States immediately take the following steps:
* Recognize the humanitarian crisis occurring within the Northern Triangle
countries and the legitimate need of individuals from these countries for refugee
protection. The United States should immediately recognize those fleeing from El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as a refugee population and tailor all policies in
accordance with a protection-based approach, informed by humanitarian principles and
domestic and international refugee obligations. Failure to do so has led to a raft of
misinformed, abusive policies by US authorities as well as law enforcement officials
in Mexico and Central America. Taken together, such policies violate myriad rights of
refugees, including their fundamental right to non-refoulement. US government action
must reflect rather than contravene the internationally- and domestically-recognized
right of individuals to seek asylum.
* Cease funding enforcement efforts aimed at stopping the flow of refugees through
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, and shift funding to protection efforts.
The US government should immediately cease funding, training, and encouraging the
governments of Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala to interdict asylum
seekers. Aggressive enforcement action preventing refugees from journeying north
to seek protection risks the return of migrant children and families to persecution or
torture. Funding that promotes military and police action against bona fide asylum
seekers should end entirely. Funding for immigration authorities should shift to support
the capacity of Mexico and other countries to screen migrants for protection needs and
vulnerabilities and to strengthen countries' asylum systems, including the provision of
full due process protections.
* End family detention. DHS must immediately cease its inhumane and misguided
deterrence strategy of locking away asylum seeker children and their parents in family
detention. There is simply no humane way to incarcerate refugee children. Depriving
children of their liberty in remote, for-profit, prison-like detention centers is both
morally repugnant and illegal. Numerous studies have shown alternatives to detention
to be effective in ensuring appearance at court hearings (Noferi 2015; MRS USCCB
and CMS 2015).38 Family detention serves no legitimate purpose - it has not in fact
deterred refugee families from fleeing for their lives - and has caused direct harm to
children's mental, emotional, and physical wellbeing.
* End raids of Central American families and children. Raids of Central American
families and children have terrorized immigrant communities, spreading fear,
misinformation, and trauma. As a result of raids, immigrant children and trauma
survivors have even ceased seeking medical treatment and attending school. The raids
raise serious constitutional concerns and have also resulted in the return of bona fide
38 Alternatives to detention programs have extremely high mtes of compliance. One study found that, from
2011 to 2013, 95 percent of participants in the "full-service" program offered by the ICE Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP) appeared at their scheduled removal hearings (Noferi 2015, 2). Additionally, a
2000 study by the Vera Institute of Justice found an 83 percent rate of full court appearance among asylum
seekers found to have a credible fear via the expedited removal process (Noferi 2015).
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asylum seekers who never had a chance to present their claims in court. DHS should
cease these raids and focus limited law enforcement resources on more appropriate
priorities for removal - not vulnerable mothers and children fleeing persecution.
End the use of expedited removal and reinstatement of removal against asylum
seekers from Central America. DHS should immediately cease using both expedited
removal and reinstatement proceedings for all asylum seekers from Central America.
Curtailed procedures are neither appropriate nor necessary in light of the humanitarian
crisis in the region and the bona fide nature of asylum claims arising from El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala. Credible fear and reasonable fear screening processes are
too flawed to permit meaningful screening for women and children fleeing persecution
and thus using these processes results in refoulement of refugees in violation of law. To
the extent that individuals lack meritorious claims, normal immigration procedures in
immigration court can ensure removal of those with no relief In particular, DHS should
never subject children to expedited screening, even when they arrive with families.
Child cases require an appropriate setting, adequate time, and heightened safeguards to
ensure correct outcomes. Expedited removal of children arriving with families, by its
very nature, provides none of these necessary protections.
* Cease to accelerate immigration proceedings for unaccompanied children and
adults with children, including asylum interviews of children. Accelerating cases
of vulnerable asylum seekers, and in particular families and unaccompanied children,
places them at risk of removal to persecution and harm. "Rocket dockets" create serious
barriers to obtaining counsel, particularly since many of the lawyers are representing
clients on a pro bono basis, and impede the ability of those fortunate enough to find
attorneys to adequately prepare their cases. The Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) should cease to accelerate the initial court hearings of children and families and
ensure that immigration judges grant appropriate continuances to individuals seeking
counsel. In addition, US Citizenship and Immigration Services should not accelerate
the asylum interviews of unaccompanied children unless requested to do so by the
applicant (USCIS 2015). Children's cases require careful development over time, as
attorneys need to establish rapport and build trust, particularly with children who have
suffered trauma or gender-based violence and are reluctant to reveal abuse to people
they do not know well.
* Analyze asylum claims in a manner consistent with international law and guidance
on the proper definition of a refugee. The United States should immediately and
publicly clarify that claims based on violence by gangs and organized criminal syndicates
may be a basis for asylum, and should cease adopting contrary positions before the
federal courts and within its own agencies. As a matter of law, asylum determinations
must be made on a case-by-case basis, and numerous courts have granted claims based
on violence at the hands of criminal gangs. In addition, the administration should adopt
positions in litigation and/or issue regulations that clarify asylum standards consistent
with international law and guidance. This should include clarifying that membership in
a particular social group requires only that members share an immutable or fundamental
characteristic.
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* Expand and fund access to counsel for asylum seekers, and in particular Central
American children and families. The administration should expand funding for
counsel for asylum seekers in general, and in particular for Central American children
and families. Studies have shown that counsel is critical to the outcomes of asylum
cases. Unaccompanied children with counsel are five times more likely to obtain
asylum or other relief than unrepresented children; and families with counsel are
fourteen times more likely to prevail than unrepresented families (TRAC 2015a; TRAC
2015b). Although we commend the Obama administration for having provided funding
for many unaccompanied children in removal proceedings, the United States should
increase the scope and scale of funded representation. Children, both unaccompanied
and with families, should never be forced to defend themselves without counsel
against a government attorney. In addition, in light of the complexity of asylum law,
the defensive nature of immigration court proceedings, and the bona fide nature of
claims from the region, the government should expand funding for asylum seekers
from Central America in general.
* Fund programs that address root causes of migration in El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala, and in particular those that ameliorate the social exclusion, lack
of social support, and risk factors underlying violence and persecution. Funding
for the Northern Triangle countries has largely focused on law enforcement and military
backing, such as through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
This approach raises significant concerns due to well-documented human rights abuses
committed by military and police. Moreover, security-based approaches by and large
fail in the long-term because they address only the symptoms rather than the underlying
conditions that allow violence and persecution to flourish. Funding should instead focus
on diminishing poverty and its resulting social exclusion; increasing employment and
educational opportunities; ameliorating existing societal inequality and discrimination;
building community-based resources; strengthening child welfare protection systems;
and improving judicial capacity and governmental transparency.
* Improve, expand, and strengthen in-country refugee processing for individuals in
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States should expand in-country
processing for both adults and children in need of refugee protections in the Northern
Triangle countries. In particular, it should expand the CAM Program to include any
child who would meet the definition of a refugee, including children who do not have
parents with legal status in the United States. All children in need of refugee protection
- irrespective of their parents' status - are vulnerable to serious abuse in the
increasingly dangerous journey north through irregular channels. By excluding many of
these children based on the immigration status of their parents, the CAM Program fails
to address the protection needs of children in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In
addition, in-country processing for adults and families should be expanded. The recent
expansion of the CAM Program and the collaborations with the government of Costa
Rica, UNHCR, and IOM are encouraging developments; however, the US government
should broaden refugee processing and protection in the region further.
* Grant temporary protected status to individuals from Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador. Although we urge the full recognition and protection of those fleeing
persecution from the Northern Triangle as refugees through the above measures, DHS
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should also enact temporary protections to ensure that no individuals are deported
back to persecution. Specifically, the United States should designate the nationals of
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador for temporary protected status (TPS). TPS
provides relief from the risk of immediate deportation as well as work authorization
(although it does not provide a path to more permanent protection and benefits, as does
asylum).3 9 Currently, some nationals of Honduras and El Salvador hold TPS, but only
if they entered before 1999 and 2001, respectively. The administration should designate
all three Northern Triangle countries for TPS status, including for recent entrants.
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